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“It’s Time to Press ‘Play’ Once 
Again!” 
Gerald Epstein’s appeal to restart 
OTA in the US, with an introduc-
tion by Michael Rader1 
The Congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment (OTA) was created in the United 
States by statute in 19722 and closed as the re-
sult of denial of funds on September 30, 1996. A 
major reason for this denial of funds seems to 
have been the Republican majority’s intention to 
demonstrate its determination to cut Congress’ 
own spending. The OTA was the smallest con-
gressional institution, so it was expected that 
resistance would be minimal. It has never been 
formally abolished and ever since the Office 
was put on hold, there have been initiatives to 
awaken the institution from what is hoped will 
have been temporary hibernation. 
As indicated in the appeal by Gerald Ep-
stein which follows, a complete archive of 
OTA’s legacy has been maintained by the Fed-
eration of American Scientists. This can form a 
kind of institutional memory to help kick-start 
a revived OTA into operation. Additionally, an 
Institute for Technology Assessment was set up 
by Vary Coates and others as a private initia-
tive doing OTA-like studies immediately after 
OTA’s demise until about 1998 as an accom-
panying measure to restoration efforts. A spe-
cial issue of the international journal “Techno-
logical Forecasting and Social Change” pub-
lished shortly after the OTA closed its doors3 
retraces and analyses the history of the Office 
and its seminal influence on technology as-
sessment worldwide, particularly in Europe. 
This theme was explored further in a reader 
edited by Norman Vig, an early key figure in 
attempts to revive the OTA in the US, and Her-
bert Paschen, then director of ITAS and the 
TAB.4 If and when the OTA is revived, ITAS 
and the other members of EPTA (the European 
Parliamentary Technology Assessment network) 
are obviously prepared to share their experience 
with actors involved in the revival of the OTA. 
A noteworthy milestone in the drive to re-
instate the OTA was a workshop organised on 
June 14, 2001 by Granger Morgan, a Carnegie 
Mellon University engineering professor who 
had been an OTA consultant in its heyday. 
Among the participants along with prominent 
former members of the OTA staff were a num-
ber of members of congress. In particular, Rep. 
Rush Holt (Democrat, New Jersey), a physicist 
by training, has undertaken several initiatives 
to provide a revived OTA with adequate fund-
ing. The most visible result of these initiatives 
until now has been the allocation of $ 2.5 mil-
lion to the Government Accountability Office 
for technology assessment work.5 Holt is very 
much a lone figure, due, he feels, to the failure 
of many Members of Congress to see any sci-
entific component to many policy issues, such 
as electronic voting.6 Although the IEEE-USA 
has endorsed legislative efforts to re-establish 
technology assessment at US Congress, pro-
gress was minimal.7 
Surprising support for the resuscitation of 
the OTA came from Hillary Clinton during her 
election campaign for the presidential candi-
date nomination by the Democrat party.8 The 
president patently does not have the power to 
set up institutions serving Congress, and Ms. 
Clinton was not exactly active in initiatives to 
revive the OTA during her term in the senate. 
Even so, the specific mention of the OTA dur-
ing the primaries indicates that the time is ripe 
for a strong new attempt to enlist Congres-
sional support for a new OTA. 
As a beneficiary of the OTA’s pioneering 
role in parliamentary technology assessment in 
its own work for both the German and Euro-
pean parliaments, ITAS supports and whole-
heartedly endorses the appeal to restart the 
OTA which we have reprinted below in a mar-
ginally reduced version. 
Documentation of the Appeal 
Restart the Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment 
By Gerald L. Epstein on March 31, 2009 
In 1972, Congress realized that technology’s 
applications were becoming more “extensive, 
pervasive, and critical.” However, Congress 
also recognized that neither its own organiza-
tions nor those of the executive branch were 
producing the information and analysis needed 
to make competent decisions about technol-
ogy’s impacts. With the Technology Assess-
ment Act of 1972, Congress created a new 
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agency – the Congressional Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, known as OTA – to provide 
“unbiased information concerning the physical, 
biological, economic, social, and political ef-
fects” of technological applications. 
Over the next 23 years, OTA studied some 
of the most controversial and technically inten-
sive issues of its time, winning national and 
international acclaim. Its reports on topics such 
as climate change, education, energy, environ-
mental protection, food production, health, 
national defense, telecommunications, terror-
ism, and transportation, among many others, 
addressed issues before almost every Congres-
sional committee. 
When the Republicans took control of 
both Houses of Congress in 1994, Congress 
voted not to fund OTA for the next fiscal year, 
and the agency ceased operations in September 
1995. Yet it was not abolished. The Technol-
ogy Assessment Act of 1972 remains on the 
books, so all it would take to restart OTA 
would be an appropriation. Whatever the rea-
sons for OTA’s defunding during that conten-
tious and volatile transition 15 years ago, it did 
not constitute a referendum on the agency’s 
overall value or competence. 
Today, Congress still lacks a dedicated 
capability to analyze scientific and technologi-
cal issues, even though they undoubtedly play a 
greater role in public policy than they did forty 
years ago. As a result, not only is Congress 
handicapped in its ability to deal with the criti-
cal technological components of current policy 
issues, but it is also poorly suited to anticipate 
the significance or the implications of emerg-
ing technologies. 
Simply put, Congress pushed OTA’s 
“Pause” key in 1995. It’s time to press “Play” 
once again. 
1 OTA archive 
Over its history, OTA informed members of 
Congress and their staffs and helped shape 
legislation. But its reports played a far wider 
role. Since they explained complicated techni-
cal concepts to a non-technical audience, they 
were widely circulated, attracting considerable 
public attention. 
The Federation of American Scientists 
maintains a comprehensive archive of OTA 
reports online at: http://fas.org/ota 
2 A comprehensive record of achievement 
and integrity 
Over its history, OTA informed members of 
Congress and their staffs and helped shape 
legislation. But its reports played a far wider 
role. Since they explained complicated techni-
cal concepts to a non-technical audience, they 
were widely circulated, attracting considerable 
public attention. “The Office of Technology 
Assessment does some of the best writing on 
security-related technical issues in the United 
States,” said the journal Foreign Affairs. OTA 
has “produced hundreds of policy-related re-
ports, and has developed a reputation for objec-
tive, non-partisan, and comprehensive assess-
ments of public policy issues with highly tech-
nical aspects,” according to the American As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science. 
Critical review of OTA reports from both pub-
lic and expert audiences amplified their mes-
sage and validated their value and quality. 
Ironically, the scientific community’s 
strong support for OTA may have created the 
false impression that OTA primarily served to 
support scientists. This is like saying that tele-
vision weather announcers primarily serve to 
support professional meteorologists – which is, 
of course, precisely backwards. Meteorologists 
already know the weather. The role of televi-
sion weather announcers is to take meteoro-
logical forecasts, turn them into language the 
rest of us can understand, and enable us all to 
make better plans. The scientific community 
supported OTA not because it benefitted scien-
tists directly, but because it enabled members 
of Congress to make better decisions about 
policy issues with significant scientific and 
technological components. 
OTA’s unique value derived from its 
authoritativeness and credibility.9 Its position 
within Congress gave it authority: OTA was 
overseen by a Congressional Board and worked 
on studies requested by Congressional commit-
tees. This vantage point ensured the relevance 
of OTA’s work and elicited the cooperation of 
outside parties. It also came with the recogni-
tion that nobody elected OTA to make policy 
decisions. As a result, OTA made no policy 
recommendations, but rather offered a range of 
policy options that were consistent with its 
technical findings. 
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OTA won credibility by ensuring that its 
studies were technically accurate, analytically 
sound, and balanced with respect to stakeholder 
interests. All major OTA studies relied on advi-
sory panels of experts who served as sources of 
information, guidance, and critical review. 
These panels included top substantive experts, 
who helped assure the studies’ technical and 
analytic quality, and individuals representing the 
different interests at stake, who were sensitive to 
the balance among competing views. 
3 Objectivity in an intensely political 
environment 
In an environment as intensely political as the 
U.S. Congress, perhaps OTA’s greatest chal-
lenges were to insulate itself from political 
pressure and to minimize any biases in its own 
operations. These responsibilities fell to its 
Congressional oversight body, the Technology 
Assessment Board. TAB’s voting members 
consisted of six senators and six members of 
the House of Representatives, evenly split 
among majority and minority parties no matter 
what the composition of either chamber. This 
balance made TAB the most bipartisan Con-
gressional committee possible. TAB selected 
the OTA director and approved the initiation 
and the release of OTA’s major reports. TAB’s 
composition ensured that the agency served as 
a shared resource, that its workload was not 
dominated by some committees over others, 
and that its reports did not advantage certain 
political parties or interests. 
4 Restarting OTA 
The argument to restart OTA is overwhelming. 
At a February meeting of the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science, Har-
vard Kennedy School Professor Emeritus 
Lewis Branscomb argued that technical under-
standing is much more critical to public policy 
today than it was when OTA was defunded in 
1995. He also pointed out that in the light of 
global competition – and the growing scien-
tific, engineering, and management strength of 
China, India, and other rapidly growing 
economies – the American economy is more 
dependent than ever on innovation. (…) 
Moreover, the arguments against restarting 
OTA are weak: 
- OTA was too slow. OTA was sometimes 
criticized for not meeting legislative needs 
in a timely way. But this accusation was se-
lectively applied and often irrelevant. Re-
ports could be done rapidly when Congres-
sional timelines required it.10 However, 
Congress already had the Congressional Re-
search Service and did not need a second 
agency to do quick turnaround research. 
OTA’s primary mission – looking compre-
hensively at the consequences of new tech-
nologies and synthesizing alternate policy 
options to deal with them – required a com-
plex, dispassionate analysis not tied to 
short-term political imperatives. Pathbreak-
ing efforts, particularly when there was little 
existing work to draw on, took time and 
yielded commensurate benefits. Such stud-
ies built the base from which OTA could re-
spond rapidly to related requests. 
A look back shows that rather than be-
ing late, OTA had considered many issues 
with depth and perception long before they 
came to the general attention of legislators. 
For example, after the September 11 attacks 
and the anthrax letters of the following 
month, members of Congress (and many 
others) reached for the 1993 OTA reports 
on “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction.” (…) 
- OTA was politically biased. Bias is in the 
eye of the beholder. It would be astounding 
if, out of the nearly 750 publications OTA 
produced over its 23-year history, none had 
ever been challenged on these grounds, par-
ticularly given that almost every topic OTA 
addressed had ardent advocates on all sides. 
But most external observers found no over-
all justification for such allegations. OTA’s 
practice of making all its unclassified re-
ports available to the public was the best 
way to uncover bias, and its oversight by a 
strictly bipartisan Congressional Board was 
the best way to defend against it. 
- Members of Congress can just call on scien-
tists directly, or go to the Internet, for scien-
tific advice. Former Speaker Newt Gingrich 
criticized OTA for interposing non-expert 
staff between members of Congress and top 
scientists. Although members of Congress 
can certainly reach out to scientific experts, 
that hardly replaces OTA. 
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The OTA model, honed over 23-years of serv-
ing Congressional and national needs, has 
been proven. 
First of all, interactions with individual ex-
perts can be rigged by the politically based se-
lection of experts. More importantly, as George 
Mason University science policy expert Chris-
topher Hill told the AAAS meeting earlier this 
year, Internet sources such as Wikipedia can 
provide information that is rapidly updated and 
community-vetted, but they cannot perform the 
type of integrative, multidisciplinary analysis 
that is necessary to address today’s policy con-
cerns. Policy debates don’t hinge on the kind of 
information that any technical expert or web site 
– no matter how eminent or accurate – can im-
part in single interchange. As Hill told the 
AAAS crowd, Congress is not particularly inter-
ested in the melting point of bismuth. 
OTA’s process was far richer. It tapped the 
nation’s expertise in the full range of technical 
and policy disciplines, placed that information in 
policy context, evaluated the significance of 
knowledge gaps and uncertainties, formulated 
and analyzed policy options, and communicated 
its results in ways that non-scientists could un-
derstand. This process was very much a collabo-
rative and interdisciplinary enterprise, and it 
added value far beyond any number of one-on-
one interactions with experts. 
5 There’s not a moment to lose 
The OTA model, honed over 23-years of serv-
ing Congressional and national needs, has been 
proven. Nobody would argue that OTA was 
perfect. However, the Technology Assessment 
Act has turned out to be an amazingly flexible 
document, and any needed improvements can be 
done within its scope. The agency’s structure, as 
defined in 1972, remains appropriate today. 
Conversely, legislatively reauthorizing 
OTA in order to rename it, redefine its mis-
sion, or dramatically change its governance 
structure is likely to be an extended, multi-
year process, as was OTA’s creation. Together 
with the possibility of politically-motivated 
legislative roadblocks, a reauthorization 
would be unlikely to succeed, killing any 
near-term hope of reestablishing a technical 
advisory mechanism for Congress. 
Even winning an appropriation for OTA 
will not be easy. At a time of economic crisis, 
government spending that is not for the pur-
pose of economic recovery faces extraordinary 
funding pressures. But the costs of making 
technically inappropriate policy choices vastly 
exceed the cost of thinking things through. 
OTA knew how to provide scientific and 
technical advice in a way that was directly trans-
latable to Congress.  We just need to restart it. 
Documentation printed with the permission of 
Science Progress (URL to article: http://www. 
scienceprogress.org/2009/03/restart-ota/). 
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